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BOOK REVIEWS
A THEORY or JusTicE. By John Rawls. Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press. 1971. Pp. xv, 607. $15.00 cloth, $3.95 paper.*

I
INTRODUCTION
The contribution of twentieth-century moral philosophy to the
solution of pressing social problems has been minimal. G.E. Moore's
"naturalistic fallacy" and the application of A.J. Ayer's verifiability
criterion of meaning convinced a generation of philosophers that ethics,
understood as the formulation and defense of substantive moral prin.
ciples, is impossible. Philosophers' only legitimate task, so it was
thought, lay in elucidating the language of morality and the vocabulary
of politics. Thus, in a well-known book intended to bring the reader to
grips with the fundamental problems of ethics, the author declared,
"Ethics, as I conceive it, is the logical study of the language of morals."'
Ethics, paradoxically, seemed to be irrelevant to moral concerns. One
need not deny that linguistic analysis has clarified and deepened our
understanding of moral concepts and judgments to suggest that philosophers must do more. In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls demonstrates that one can address living moral, political and social issues
sensitively and forcefully without sacrificing philosophic standards of
clarity and rigor.
A Theory of Justice includes much more that its title suggests. In
addition to elaborating and defending principles of social justice, moral
sentiments, principles of moral psychology and the unity of self, the
nature of goodness and happiness are discussed. While these and other
subjects are not simply addenda to Rawls's theory, I shall concentrate
solely on the theory of social justice developed in the first two-thirds of
* Citations to A Theory of Justice are to the paperback edition.
1 R. Hare, The Language of Morals, at v (1952). Hare is not alone in his

preoccupation with meta-ethical questions-with questions about moral discourse,
especially questions concerning meaning, the nature of moral judgments and
methods of justifying or supporting moral judgments. Throughout the nineteen

forties and fifties, substantive moral and political philosophy was virtually dead.
Studies sharing Hare's conception of ethics are: K. Baler, The Moral Point of
View (1958); P. Nowell-Smaith, Ethics (1954); C. Stevenson, Ethics and Language

(1943); and S. Toulmin, Reason in Ethics (1990). For an instructive essay, see
IV. Frankena, Moral Philosophy at Mid-Century, 60 Philosophical Rev. 44

(1951). Two questions have troubled writers on meta-ethics in recent years: (1)
Does acceptance of a particular meta-ethical theory logically commit one to the

acceptance of any particular normative theory, and the converse; and (2) Is the
distinction between normative and meta-ethical judgments sound? Tie first
question concerns independence; the second concerns neutrality. One of tice first

books to break away from an exclusive concern with mcta-etbics is M. Singer,
Generalization in Ethics (1961). Curiously, Rawls, who is generous In citing his
predecessors, never mentions Singer's book.
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the book. Particular attention will be paid to Rawls's general approach
to theory-construction in ethics, his contractualism and the novel analytic construct from which he derives his twin principles of justice. Only
after examining Rawls's methodology will I consider the principles of
justice themselves. So that we will not lose our bearings, however, I
begin with a thumbnail sketch of Rawls's general argument.
All of us have intuitive beliefs regarding justice, though few of us
have anything like a theory of justice. Because our intuitions conflict or
otherwise fail us, we seek a theory which will systematize and deepen
our conception of justice. In developing any theory, we cannot begin
from scratch; we must begin with our considered judgments, judgments
that any plausible principle must confirm. However, as our theory
develops we may modify or even abandon some of our initial beliefs,
especially those which are, upon reflection, confused, inconsistent or
the consequence of prejudice. Yet, however far our theory takes us from
these initial beliefs, we cannot begin without them. Our aim is to reach
a state of "reflective equilibrium," a state in which our principles and
judgments coincide and in which we know the principles to which our
judgments conform and the premises of their derivation (cf. p. 20).
To guide our deliberations we may "imagine that those who engage
in social cooperation choose together, in one joint act, the principles
which are to assign basic rights and duties and to determine the division
of social benefits" (p. 11). The "most philosophically favored interpretation" of this initial choice situation, called the original position,
will show that two principles of justice would be agreed upon, the first
taking precedence over the second:
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive
basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that
they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage,
and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all (p. 60).
These principles apply primarily to the basic structure of society, i.e.,
to the political constitution and to the principal economic and social
institutions. They may or may not have wider application. Further
both principles assume full compliance; social problems arising out of
partial compliance create special difficulties. However, only an ideal
theory can provide a systematic basis for the solution of contemporary
social problems; unless we understand the nature and aims of a perfectly just society, we will lack a satisfactory standpoint from which to
evaluate existing institutions and their practices.
II
METHODOLOGY

A.

The Pragmatic Approach

Rawls adopts a currently fashionable account of theory-construction
in the sciences. Rather than theorize on a bedrock of indubitable truths,
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as Cartesians would have us do, we are urged to begin with what we do
not in fact doubt, e.g., that water boils at 100' C. at sea level. Hypotheses are then formed to ground such beliefs and to shed light on a
variety of theoretical and practical problems we wish to solve (such as
why altitude affects the boiling point of water). At an early stage of
theorizing, hypotheses usually give way to firmly held beliefs if conflicts
between them occur; but as hypotheses become imbedded in our con.
ceptual scheme because of their explanatory power and connections with
other hypotheses, we often sacrifice cherished beliefs in order to save our
theories. In short, theorizing is a dialectical, self-correcting process of
mutual adjustment among observations, hypotheses and theories.
Physical theories are now deeply imbedded in our thinking, though
this was not always so. Psychological and sociological theories, on the
other hand, have significantly less standing, so we are reluctant to
modify our intuitive beliefs about human nature and society to satisfy
someone's pet hypothesis. Ethical theories have even less claim to our
allegiance. Most of us, for instance, believe that racism and slavery
are unjust; if any theory implies otherwise, so much the worse for itl
What we seek is a theory that will explain the injustice of racism and
slavery and at the same time provide guidance where our moral beliefs
are vague, tentative or inconsistent. While it would be rash to suppose
that any ethical theory could possess the power of physical or biological
theories, Rawls believes that his own conception of justice as fairness is
a distinct improvement over previous conceptions, including utilitarian
conceptions.
One virtue of Rawls's pragmatic approach is that it narrows the
gap between scientific and ethical theories. Briefly, a scientific theory
must answer adequately serious objections to it, have good reasons in
its favor and be superior to its rivals in terms of simplicity, fruitfulness,
thoroughness and compatibility with other accepted theories., These
same criteria apply to ethical theories, albeit in a somewhat different
fashion. Unless an ethical theory can answer serious objections, for
example, it must be rejected. No doubt the nature of "serious objections" and "adequate answers" changes as we pass from science to
ethics, but this should not blind us to the underlying unity of the
critical processes involved or to the fact that the nature of "serious
objections" and "adequate answers" also varies within the sciences
themselves. Another virtue of Rawls's pragmatic approach is that defi2 There is a cursory discussion of the criteria of acceptability in science and
their applicability to ethics in R. Garner & B. Rosen, Moral Philosophy, ch. 1
(1967). For a somewhat lengthier discussion of criteria of confirmation and acceptability, see R. Harr6, An Introduction to the Logic of the Sciences (1960),
or C. Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science (1966).

Rawls himself traces his

approach to the work of IV. Quine, Word and Object (1960), and of M. Whte,
Toward Reunion in Philosophy (1956). Quine and White, colleagues of Rawb at

Harvard, trace their roots back to the pragmatism of Charles Sanders Peirceo and
John Dewey.
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nitions are kept in their places Key concepts are introduced and explained only as needed and only within the context of the entire theory;
they have little or no life away from their theoretical home. Definitions
occur, if at all, only after one understands the role of the defined concept within the theory. Thus, theories and definitions stand or fall
together, an insight not always acknowledged by linguistic analysts.
One may feel that the pragmatic approach is bound to generate
circular theories, since one uses intuitive convictions to formulate principles that are then confirmed by showing that they account for these
same convictions. Were this all that was accomplished, one's theory
would indeed be circular; fortunately, Rawls strives for much more.
He argues, for example, that adoption of his two principles reconciles
freedom and reason, helps explain the place of moral sentiments (such as
shame, guilt, resentment and indignation) in our lives, fixes the proper
relationship between majority rule and minority rights and explains
the grounds for civil disobedience and political obligation. Principles of
justice established through Rawls's general pragmatic approach therefore take us beyond our initial beliefs both by providing guidance in
matters where we lack firm convictions and by showing how apparently
unrelated beliefs form a coherent system.4
B. The Social Contract and the Original Position
Social contract theories are in general disrepute for reasons which,
if not always sound, are at least well-known. Rawls's decision to cast
his theory in contractarian language may therefore come as a surprise.
However, he sidesteps many familiar objections by denying that the
contracting parties he has in mind are negotiating to enter a particular
society or to form a particular government. Rather,
3 See G. Field, The Place of Definition in Ethics, in 3 University of Bristol
Studies, Studies in Philosophy (1935), reprinted in Readings in Ethical Theory
92-102 (1st ed. W. Sellars & J. Hospers eds. 1952).
4 The pragmatic approach espoused by Rawls is not without pitfalls and
limitations. William James, for instance, thought that a coherent, fruitful and
superior theory was true. It follows from James's analysis that the Ptolemaic
theory of planetary motion was once true but is now false. Rawls avoids this
mistake, though he does so in part because he ignores questions of truth altogether.
This may or may not be a virtue of the contract approach. Even granting the
usefulness of the pragmatic approach in science, one wonders whether moral
judgments, beliefs and convictions can play the same role that reports of
empirical observations play. This question arises not simply because agreement on
moral matters is difficult to obtain or because of the complezity of human conduct,
but because one needs to determine and justify the status of moral judgments.
Skeptics will argue that Rawls offers no more than a theory of a-rational prefer-

ences. To put the question in Kantiant terms, Rawls must show that moral
judgments are possible before claiming that he has established an objective theory
of social justice. Following Kant further, we may ask whether ethical theories

must in fact justify initial moral judgments at all-perhaps we should begin
instead with certain moral concepts (such as duty) that even conflicting initial
beliefs embody.
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the guiding idea is that the principles of justice for the basic structure of
society are the object of the original agreement. They are the principles
that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests
would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association. These principles are to regulate till
further agreements; they specify the kinds of social cooperation that
can be entered into and the forms of government that can be established.
This way of regarding the principles of justice I shall call justice as
fairness (p. 11).
Much of A Theory of Justice is devoted to explaining and defending the
content of this passage.
Classical contract theorists had employed the notion of a state of
nature to show what life would be like were men to live outside of
society and to argue from that hypothetical state of affairs that certain
features must characterize a just and well-governed society. Because
Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau offered such radically divergent descriptions of life in a state of nature, it is not surprising that they defended
equally divergent political principles and institutions. Although the
concept of an original position resembles a state of nature in some
respects, it differs in that it does not even pretend to describe a possible
historical situation-the conditions defining the original position could
not possibly occur. The original position is in fact a hypothetical construct from which one can derive principles of justice that are acceptable
from a moral point of view. Because it plays a crucial role in the deriva.
tion of Raws's two principles, its nature and function must be fully
explored.
The original position is the "most philosophically favored interpretation of [the] initial choice situation for the purposes of a theory
of justice" (p. 18). To satisfy ourselves that we have hit upon the most
philosophically favored interpretation we must limit ourselves to shared
but weak conditions and match the principles that would be chosen
(given those conditions) against our considered moral convictions. Since
we wish to derive moral principles from the original position, it is
essential that the description of the original position be free of moral
and value assumptions; otherwise the principles will only appeal to
those already convinced. I shall follow Rawls in considering the original
position under the headings of the circumstances of justice, the formal
constraints of the concept of right, the veil of ignorance and the rationality of the contracting parties.
By the circumstances of justice Rawls means "the normal conditions under which human cooperation is both possible and necessary"
(p. 126); in the main, his account follows that of Hume. Society, Rawls
maintains, is a cooperative venture for mutual advantage marked by
both an identity and a divergence of interests; the identity makes social
life possible and the divergence makes institutions necessary. Among
the objective circumstances of justice are that individuals live in close
5 See D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, pt. II, § II (1740),
and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, § III, pt. I (1751).
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proximity to one another, are vulnerable to attack and to having their
interests blocked by others, are *roughly similar in physical and mental

powers and live under conditions of moderate scarcity. The subjective
circumstances of justice include the fact that individuals, though capable
of cooperation and a sense of justice, have collectively a variety of
incompatible life-plans which demand conflicting shares of natural and
social resources for their attainment. Further, men espouse incompatible
philosophical, religious and political views. All of us, moreover, suffer
the frailties of human nature: shortcomings of knowledge, thought,
judgment and an assortment of moral faults.
Thus far, the description depicts life as it is. In rounding out his
account, however, Rawls stipulates that the contracting parties are
wholly self-interested; he does so in order "to insure that the principles
of justice do not depend on strong assumptions" (p. 129). The fact that
people form bonds of affection and take an altruistic interest in the
interests of others can only strengthen adherence to principles adopted
on the assumption of mutual self-interest.
Those in the original position think and act under certain constraints. Constraints of right hold for the choice of any moral principles,
including principles of social justice. Rawls regards them as formal
constraints, though he sees that they are not without moral force, since
they rule out egoism. He emphasizes that "the conditions are not justified by definition or the analysis of concepts, but only by the reasonableness of the theory of which they are a part" (p. 131).G Just as theoretical entities in physics derive their meaning and justification from
the theory of which they are a part, so too with Rawls's five formal
constraints on the concept of right.
First, all principles must be general-avoid proper names and
arbitrary definite descriptions. Second, all principles must be universal
in application-they must hold for everyone, thereby ruling out selfcontradictory and self-defeating principles. Third, all principles must be
publicly chosen and acknowledged, thus disqualifying private, secret or
otherwise esoteric moralities. Fourth, a conception of right must impose
an ordering on conflicting claims, a task which Rawls admits is extremely difficult. And fifth, principles agreed to must be regarded as final
and conclusive. Were we able to formulate a complete theory of morality, the totality of principles would not only determine what counts as
a relevant consideration, but would assign weights as well. Conclusions
from such principles would override self-interest, custom and law. A
conception of right, then, "is a set of principles, general in form and
universal in application, that is to be publicly recognized as a final
6 In the main, Rawls follows the analysis of K. Baier, The Moral Point of
View, ch. 8 (1958). There are differences, however. The most important is that
Baier attempts to define the moral point of view from the very conception of
morality; Baier's criteria define what it means to have a moral point of view. It is
this attempt to avoid engaging in substantive, normative inquiry which Rawls
rejects.
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court of appeal for ordering the conflicting claims of moral persons"
(p. 135).
Rawls introduces the notion of pure procedural justice to insure
that any principles arrived at in the original position will be just. One
adopts this procedure, he argues, when there is no independent criterion
for the just outcome: "instead there is a correct or fair procedure such
that the outcome is likewise correct or fair, whatever it is, provided that
the procedure has been properly followed" (p. 86). A distinctive feature
of pure procedural justice is that the procedure must actually be used.
In games of chance, any distribution of prizes is just, provided that fair
procedures are actually used. It would be no good to hand out the prizes
randomly before commencing play and then defend the distribution on
the ground that actually playing the game according to purely procedural rules might have had exactly the same outcome. Although true,
the defense is irrelevant.
Purely procedural justice will yield a just outcome, however, only if
we assume that the contracting parties are shrouded in a veil of
ignorance, a veil nullifying "the effects of specific contingencies which
put men at odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their own advantage" (p. 136). Any information that would
enable one to negotiate for principles tailormade to one's own personal
or historical circumstances is excluded. Thus, no one knows anything
of one's natural abilities, place in society, aspirations, special psychological propensities, religious views or even the civilization to which one
belongs (cf. p. 137). However, contractors in the original position are
only selectively ignorant. Rawls assumes that they know a great many
things most of us do not know: general facts about human society (e.g.,
the circumstances of justice), the basis of social organization, the laws
of psychology, the nature of politics, principles of economics and
scientific theories generally (cf. pp. 137-38).
Particular information is restricted so that the parties have no basis
for bargaining in the usual sense-for urging principles especially favorable to oneself. Since no one knows any distinguishing facts about oneself, there is no way to hold out for self-serving principles. General
information is permissible, on the other hand, "since conceptions of
justice must be adjusted to the characteristics of the systems of social
cooperation which they are to regulate" (p. 138).
Individuals in the original position also know that they desire
certain primary goods, i.e., those goods normally necessary to or constitutive of anyone's life plan and therefore objects of everyone's rational
desires. Natural primary goods, such as intelligence and health, concern
us less than social primary goods, since only the latter are subject to
distribution by social and political institutions. Among the most important social primary goods are rights, liberties, powers, opportunities,
income, wealth and, above all, the bases of self-respect (cf. p. 62).
Rawls stipulates that individuals in the initial situation are rational,
though rationality is construed narrowly as "taking the most effective
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means to given ends" (p. 14). This account of rationality, standard in
economic and social theory, entails that rational individuals have a
coherent set of preferences, rank options according to purposes and
adopt plans satisfying more, rather than fewer, desires (cf. p. 143). By
eliminating moral preferences from his account of rationality, Rawls
believes that principles derived from his amoral construct are more likely
to be accepted. To be sure, Rawls builds into the original position what
he calls "a thin theory of the good" in order "to explain the rational
preference for primary goods and to explicate the notion of rationality
underlying the choice of principles in the original position" (p. 397).
A thin theory of good "is necessary to support the requisite premises
from which the principles of justice are derived" (id.). Because the thin
theory is confined to bare essentials that no one can deny, principles
derived from these essentials are not in danger. Rawls does depart from
the standard economic account of rationality in one respect: he assumes
that individuals in the original position, or Rational Individuals as I
shall refer to them, are not envious-Individuals who have gained a
favorable position at no cost to other Individuals will not be viewed
with hostility. Were envy permitted, the original position would yield
unacceptably egalitarian principles.
Explicit in Rawls's account of rationality is the belief that Individuals have ends, though not that mankind has any specific end. Pursuit of any end must be regulated by those principles accepted in the
original position on the assumption that Individuals are wholly selfinterested and have a variety of final ends. This is part of what Rawls
means when he says, "in justice as fairness the concept of right is prior
to that of the good" (p. 396). To use standard jargon, justice as fairness is a deontological, not a teleological, theory.7 Rawls concludes that
those principles which Rational Individuals would accept in the original
position are the correct principles of social justice that we, as flesh and
blood individuals, should apply to the basic structure of our (or any)
society.
Professor Rawis's characterization of the original position is
troubling. Only if Individuals are rational do their negotiations and
principles merit our attention, let alone our acceptance. To avoid introducing into the concept of rationality any controversial ethical statements which would jeopardize wide acceptance of the original position
as a satisfactory analytic construct, rationality is interpreted as taking
the most effective means to given ends. Neither the interpretation nor its
rationale are sound.
Throughout A Theory of Justice Rawls assumes that if everyone
would agree to an interpretation or principle when veiled in ignorance,
7

Teleological theories assert that the only consideration which mahes an

action or rule right or obligatory is the goodness of its consequences; deontological
theories claim that certain features of the act itself other than the value it brings
about must be considered. For a dear, brief introduction to ethics and kinds of

ethical theories, see W. Frankena, Ethics (1963).
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then once that veil lifts, one can only supplement, but never radically
alter or replace, that interpretation or principle. Principles of risk
accepted in the original position, for instance, are carried over intact
to situations where one does not labor under full ignorance. Yet surely
what might be agreed to under Rawls's special, stipulated conditions
would likely be uncompelling or even irrational under normal conditions; policies which are reasonable under conditions of limited knowledge may well be unreasonable given substantially more knowledge. By
holding Individuals to what they agree to when veiled in ignorance,
Rawls no doubt avoids messy disputes regarding the relevance and
weight of various considerations-but only at the cost of distorting the
concept of rationality.
Rationality interpreted as efficiency may sound plausible when ends
are not in dispute. Unfortunately, this interpretation glosses over the
fact that people have a multiplicity of ends ordered and related in complex and incompatible ways. Nor can a sharp distinction be drawn
between means and ends; means and ends are so related that, except
in the simplest cases, an alteration of one affects the nature of the other.
One cannot suppose, for example, that every effective means of teaching
people always results in their having the same education; a student who
studies Shakespeare by means of a programmed text is likely to have a
different understanding and appreciation of the subject than one who
learns Shakespeare through the theater, though both students may
possess the same facts.
Rawls's interpretation of rationality is defective in another way.
Many people value certain ends above any purely formal procedure
of decisionmaking, yet Rawls would have them sacrifice these ends for a
procedure they would have adopted had they been Rawls's Rational
Individuals. If there is an end that a man is convinced (rightly or
wrongly) requires the complete devotion of everyone, he would be
unlikely to limit his pursuit of this end whenever it ran afoul
with a procedure he did not in fact adopt. There seems to be no procedural shortcut which will eliminate conflicts over ends or, indeed, entire
ways of life. Raws, we will recall, contends that purely procedural
justice is rational "when there is no independent criterion for the right
result" (p. 86). Perhaps, but this will not persuade those who believe
that such a criterion exists and, what is more, that they know what it is.
That there is great disagreement concerning the nature of this criterion
is neither here nor there; a person who is convinced that a certain
arrangement is just will not usually be moved to adopt a principle of
pure procedural justice merely because others disagree with him. Rational Individuals adopt a purely procedural principle because they
have no deep moral and value convictions; real people who have such
convictions will resist suppositions which require that they set these
convictions aside. Rawls forbids his Rational Individuals to have a full
theory of the good because he does not wish to jeopardize the prior
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place of the concept of right, but this unfairly tips the scale against
teleological views at the outset.
The very intelligibility of the original position is not beyond
question. Can Individuals be unaware of the civilization to which they
belong, yet cognizant of the laws of economics, the principles of psychological development and the nature of political affairs? Because physical
laws are unaffected by cultural factors, may we assume that the same is
true of psychological, sociological and economic laws? Once Rawls
spells out the nature of these laws in detail, as he must, one may find
that they are only applicable to some societies at a certain stage of their
historical development. Further, if man is necessarily a social being, i.e,
a creature whose nature cannot be adequately understood apart from his
social relationships, then to develop a theory of justice from the viewpoint of theoretically defined individuals living in splendid isolation from
any particular social and historical context is misguided. If Jeremy
Bentham took human nature to be that of the English shopkeeper, as
Karl Marx alleged, at least he took the point of view of actual people
situated in an actual historical situation; Rawls's Rational Individuals,
on the other hand, correspond to no one in any social or historical situation.
Behind these specific criticisms lies a nagging feeling that the
original position merely reflects, in an abstract way, contemporary
liberal democratic attitudes--the description of it has appeal precisely
because it sums up our liberal, individualistic outlook. Perhaps this is
inevitable; given Rawls's pragmatic approach we are bound to find a
prominent place for our firmly held moral beliefs. Yet unless our attitudes and beliefs are grounded in more than consensus, their appeal
will be less widespread than Rawls anticipates. My concern, to put the
point differently, is that any principles derived from the original position will simply reproduce in theory what we heirs to the liberal, democratic Western tradition intuitively believe in fact. Unless we are provided with the metaphysics of a theory of justice, which Rawls studiously avoids, I do not see how Rawls can overcome this essentially
Hegelian objection.
Professor Rawls's decision to cast his theory in terms of an ideal
agreement or social contract is also troublesome. Specifically, Rawls
never adequately describes the tasks the social contract model performs
or how literally the model should be taken. Rawls dearly believes that
the concept of social justice can be illuminatingly analyzed in terms of
a contract which Rational Individuals in the original position would
unanimously make. Precisely what is shown, however, is never made
dear. In particular, it is not dear whether the original position and the
social contract are intended as devices (1) for analyzing a conception of
justice we already have, (2) for generating principles of justice which
then must be justified in noncontractarian ways or (3) for justifying
as well as generating principles of social justice.
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I am inclined to think that Rawls uses the original position and
the social contract simply as tools of analysis and devices for generating
principles of justice, and not as a way of justifying these principles. I
do so not because the weight of textual evidence clearly points in this
direction, but because it seems obvious that hypothetical contracts
agreed to by hypothetical individuals in a hypothetical situation cannot
bind me. How could they, when what I myself would have done (but
did not) cannot bind me. Had a particular student asked me to direct
his research, I might well have promised to do so; given that I made no
such promise, however, I am now under no obligation to him. There.
fore, if I am not bound by a hypothetical contract that I myself would
have made, I am surely not bound by a hypothetical contract that
certain mythical creatures would make.
On this interpretation of Rawls, the social contract functions as
a way of perceiving, conceiving and construing that part of morality
concerned with justice. Although other perspectives abound, none is as
fruitful. The concepts of equality and the fortuitousness of human differences in nature and situation are among the central notions Rawls's
account attempts to explain; these notions are also among our deepest
moral intuitions. The social contract itself may be an artificial notion.
But, as David AJ. Richards, a proponent of Rawls's method, declares,
there is nothing artificial or superficial about the ideas which the ideal
contract view is trying to articulate: these ideas are as real as our oldest
and most haunting collective myths. The point of the theoretical elaborateness of the ideal contract view is not artificially to sophisticate these
profound and durable ideas, but rather to provide or suggest some way
in which these ideas may be so expressed that one may fruitfully indicate how these notions establish the specific and determinate structure
of our moral experience. The notion of contractors deciding what count
as moral principles must be understood from this point of view: as a
way of giving workable expression to certain deep and permanent features
of moral thought .... 8
Like any other perspective, that of the social contract must be judged
by its fruits. To Richards this means that the social contract model must
ultimately be judged
in terms of the creative usefulness of such theoretical intricacy in providing tools with which we may take hold and better understand not only
the nature of some of the most abstract and difficult concepts which we
employ, but also bow such concepts are specifically applied to the variegated circumstances of human life.9
I have spoken of the social contract as a model from which one can
rigorously deduce principles of justice, and certainly there are passages
to justify this interpretation. Rawls claims, for example, that his argument "aims eventually to be strictly deductive . .. We should strive
8 D. Richards, A Theory of Reasons for Action 91 (1971). Rawls supervised
Richards's undergraduate senior thesis, and Richards acknowledges the considerable
influence Rawls's own work has had on him; clearly, the influence is enormous.
9 Id.
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for a kind of moral geometry with all the rigor which this name connotes" (p. 121). Other passages suggest that the social contract and the
original position are merely vivid metaphors -which play no essential
role in the argument. Thus, we find Rawls asserting:
To say that a certain conception of justice would be chosen in the original
position is equivalent to saying that rational deliberation satisfying certain conditions and restrictions would reach a certain conclusion. If
necessary, the argument to this result could be set out more formally.
I shall, however, speak throughout in terms of the notion of the original
position. It is more economical and suggestive, and brings out certain
essential features that otherwise one might easily overlook (p. 138 (emphasis added); cf. pp. 21-22).
Whether model or metaphor, the social contract and the original position
give rise to certain misgivings as regards their usefulness. Some of these
have already been discussed; others will be mentioned as we examine
Rawls's principles of justice.
II1
Two PIcIPLES or SocIAL JusTicE
Rational Individuals in the original position, we are told, would
adopt two principles of justice ranked in a certain order. According to
the principle of equal liberty, "[e]ach person is to have an equal right
to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible
with a similar system of liberty for all" (p. 302). This principle, Rawls
argues, takes precedence over the principle regulating economic and
social inequalities, for, assuming a minimum level of general well-being,
it is "irrational from the standpoint of the original position to acknowledge a lesser liberty for the sake of greater material means and amenities
of office" (p. 542). Economic and social benefits (and burdens) are to
be distributed in accordance with the principle of equal benefits and
opportunities: "Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so
that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged ...
and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of
fair equality of opportunity" (p. 302).
Assuming a minimum level of general well-being, liberty can be
restricted only if a less extensive liberty strengthens the total Ohared
system of liberty or if unequal liberty is acceptable to those who will
have less liberty. Liberty of conscience and the rights which define the
integrity of the person are our fundamental basic liberties; certain
political rights, on the other hand, may be foregone either to strengthen
the entire system of justice or to compensate those less fortunate (ci.
p. 247). Yet even these inequalities are justified only as long as social
conditions are being developed under which less than equal liberty
would be unjustified. Raws's purpose in ordering the two principles as
he does is to prohibit exchanges between basic liberties and economic
or social benefits. If minimum human wants are satisfied, economic
considerations cannot justify suspension of any basic liberties, including
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the right to vote and to hold public office, freedom of speech and assembly and the right to hold personal (not necessarily private) property.
Once the principle of equal liberty is satisfied, one might be
tempted to adopt the principle of Pareto optimality to determine a just
distribution of goods. According to this principle, "a configuration is
efficient whenever it is impossible to change it so as to make some
persons (at least one) better off without at the same time making other
persons (at least one) worse off" (p. 67). Although Rational Individuals
would accept this principle to judge the efficiency of their economic and
social arrangements, Rawls argues convincingly that they would reject
it as a principle of justice, since there are usually many arrangements
which, though efficient, are manifestly unjust-including the limiting
case where one person (or class) receives every available benefit.
If Rational Individuals would reject the principle of efficiency, so
would they also reject any utilitarian principle. Classical utilitarianism,
which bids us to maximize total (net) benefits, permits and even requires some people to carry enormous burdens provided only that their
sacrifices maximize utility over the whole society. Since we are assuming
that utility cannot serve as the first principle of justice and that the
principle of equal liberty, which is the first principle, has been satisfied,
the worst cases of injustice could not occur. Even so, there would seem
to be no reason why a Rational Individual would choose a principle of
distribution which might well be to his disadvantage however much it
might benefit society as a whole. For similar reasons, Rational Individuals would reject suggestions that average (net) utility be maximized.
Rational Individuals in the original position, Rawls argues, would
adopt the difference principle. Of the various efficient arrangements, the
difference principle singles out that distribution of benefits which improves the expectations of the least advantaged members of society:
Assuming the framework of institutions required by equal liberty and
fair equality of opportunity, the higher expectations of those better
situated are just if and only if they work as part of a scheme which
improves the expectations of the least advantaged members of society.
(p. 75).
Admittedly, not all arrangements satisfying this principle will maximize
total or even average utility. However, Rational Individuals would
choose a principle promising less than the utility principle because, as
rational creatures, they would adopt a maximin policy; that is, a policy
of accepting only those principles which have the best worst result.
People who wear raincoats on cloudy days act on this policy-though a
nuisance, a raincoat guarantees the best result (keeping dry) should the
worst conditions obtain (rain), though at the cost of forfeiting one's
chances for the best possible outcome (neither rain nor raincoat). As
Rational Individuals have no idea of their eventual position in society,
they would subscribe to a maximin rule. This rule, though not part of
Rawls's definition of rationality, is presumed to guide the choice of both
principles of justice.
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By distinguishing between equal liberty and opportunity on the
one hand and the worth of equal liberty and opportunity on the other
hand, Rawls acknowledges that poverty, ignorance and natural liabilities
may render formal equality virtually worthless. However, I am not sure
that Rawls traces the implications of this distinction correctly. If everyone has equal liberty, the question of compensation for lesser liberty
obviously does not arise; but how are we to compensate the disadvantaged for the lesser worth of liberty? "The lesser worth of liberty is ...
compensated for, since the capacity of the less fortunate members of
society to achieve their aims would be even less were they not to accept
the existing inequalities whenever the difference principle is satisfied"
(p. 204). This is true but irrelevant. The disadvantaged would indeed
be ill-advised to take less than the difference principle authorizes given
that equality of liberty must be iunintained.But this begs the question.
The disadvantaged might argue that, because their basic liberties are
worth so little, they ought to be given greater liberties and rights than
the advantaged enjoy, e.g., double votes. Just this sort of argument has
in fact been advanced by radical blacks in an effort to secure automatic
representation on important decisionmaking bodies. The argument may
be unsound, unjust or both, but Rawls does not show that it is. One
might even argue that Rational Individuals obeying a maximin rule
would agree to inequalities of basic liberties in favor of disadvantaged
groups whenever the worth of liberty falls below a certain level or whenever certain human needs are being ignored by existing social institutions; after all, such inequalities would seem to maximize one's wellbeing were one to end up among the least advantaged.
The maximin rule itself needs clarification and support. In explaining the rule, Rawls says that "the two principles are those a person
would choose for the design of a society in which his enemy is to assign
him his place" (p. 152). Were one's position indeed determined by
one's enemies, Rawls's defense of the principles makes sense. However,
Brian Barry points out that "our hypothetical prindple-choosers are
not going to be assigned their positions by their enemy."10 Rather, their
positions will depend on personal characteristics and good fortune. This
play-safe strategy is therefore unnecessary.
Consider again the man who carries a raincoat on cloudy days.
If he believes that there exists a malevolent being intent on causing
him to suffer, then of course the maximin rule is reasonable; if he
believes on the other hand that there exists a benevolent being intent
on causing him to prosper, then a maximax rule, prescribing that he
opt for the best possible outcome, is reasonable. But supposing, as
he surely would, that the weather is not affected by his deliberations,
our rational man would estimate the likelihood of rain and dress
accordingly. Individuals pursuing their own interests exclusively might
choose those principles leading to a high average level of well-being;
"whether they would prefer one with more equal or less equal dis10 Barry, On Social Justice, Oxford Rev. 36 (Trinity Term 1967).
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tribution," Barry concludes, "would depend on their taste for gambling.""
Rawls introduces the veil of ignorance just to meet such objections; under conditions of ignorance, insists Rawls, Rational Individuals could not play the percentages and would therefore adopt the
maximin rule. But would they? Wouldn't it be at least as rational
to agree to a social minimum and then devise basic institutions which
would permit extreme inequalities? For no matter where one ended
up in society, one would have a roof over one's head and other necessary creature comforts. Once this floor had been decided upon, however, Rational Individuals might choose to gamble for stakes involving
substantial inequalities, especially if the inequalities were thought to
be necessary to purchase a high level of art, learning or even a hedonic
paradise.
However, supposing that Rational Individuals would subscribe
to a maximin rule, Rawls stops short of its full implications. He assumes without argument that Rational Individuals would choose principles applicable only to representative persons, not to particular or
actual persons. Yet if Rational Individuals are completely self-interested, Rawls cannot suppose that they would be concerned with the
interests of any representative or typical or average person of any
group; for no one knows whether he will be representative, typical
or average. Thus the expectations of representative persons are irrelevant. To use Rawls's own heuristic device, imagine that one's
enemy were to assign one's place in society. Adopting the maximin
rule, everyone would choose only those principles guaranteeing that
any economic or social distribution must improve the expectations
of each and every member of the least-advantaged group. Rawls's
attempt to avoid the strict egalitarian implications of the maximin
principle therefore fails.
These criticisms make apparent that the social contract conception of justice can generate any number of principles depending on
the conditions built into the interpretation of the original negotiating
position. Why should we accept the conditions Rawls imposes on
the initial choice situation? Rawls addresses this question twice, once
at the beginning of A Theory of Justice and once at the very end;
both times the answer is the same. Despite the hypothetical nature
of the original position and of the social contract,
the conditions embodied in the description of the original position are
ones that we do in fact accept. Or if we do not, then perhaps we
can be persuaded to do so by philosophical reflection. Each aspect of the
contractual situation can be given supporting grounds.... (p. 21; see
p. 587).
"Philosophical reflection" appears to refer to Rawls's belief that
moral philosophy is Socratic:
[W]e may want to change our present considered judgments once their
11 Id. at 38.
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regulative principles are brought to light. And we may want to do this
even though these principles are a perfect fit. A knowledge of these
principles may suggest further reflections that lead us to revise our
judgments.... (p. 49).
The resulting reflective equilibrium is therefore much more than
matching one's existing judgments with moral principles; the kind
of reflective equilibrium which concerns moral philosophy involves an
investigation of various conceptions of justice and a consideration of
philosophically relevant arguments on behalf of each. The original
position and the social contract, therefore, are e.xpository devices
which draw attention to conditions we either accept or can be brought
to accept.
Rawls stresses that his theory of justice is a theory of the moral
sentiments; that is, it sets out the principles governing our moral
capacities and powers, espedally our sense of justice. Limitations
of space prevent a detailed exposition and evaluation of this
aspect of Rawls's theory. I mention it, however, because of its bearing on the question of justification of the two principles of justice.
We have already seen that definitions and analyses of meaning have
no special place in Rawls's approach; they stand or fall with the
theory itself. The same is true, or is suggested to be true, of justification. "[I] f we can find an accurate account of our moral conceptions,"
Rawls declares, "then questions of meaning and justification may
prove much easier to answer. Indeed," he concludes, "some of them
may no longer be real questions at all" (p. 51). Just as developments
since Frege and Cantor have immeasurably deepened our understanding of the meaning and justification of statements in logic and mathematics, so Rawls hopes that if he can provide an adequate theory
of our moral sentiments and concepts, a similar transformation may
occur in ethics.
IV
CONCLUSION

Readers of this journal -will find that A Theory of Justice illuminates a variety of topics and controversies I have slighted or
ignored altogether: the nature and justification of conscientious refusal,
civil disobedience and political obligation; the rule of law and the
status of majority rule; the limits of tolerance and conscience; guilt,
shame and happiness; duties, natural duties and obligation; and the
nature of a well-governed society. Rawls's analyses are sensible, subtle
and occasionally yield surprising conclusions. He suggests, for instance,
that citizens generally (as opposed to officeholders) have no political
obligation (see p. 114) and that the good things of life should not
be distributed according to moral desert (see p. 310).
There is much for everyone to learn from this book, though each
reader will have his own reservations and concerns. But this much is
beyond doubt: A Theory of Justice makes an outstanding contribu-
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tion to moral, social and political thought; it deserves its inevitable
fate of being the most discussed book in its field for the next decade.
To see our place in society from the perspective of contractors
in the original position, Raws concludes, is to see it sub spccie
aeternitatis: "it is to regard the human situation not only from all
social but also from all temporal points of view" (p. 587). If A
Theory of Justice actually provides us with a temporal perspective
tied to liberal, democratic preconceptions, a perspective which may
already be on the wane, we may well recall Hegel's observation that
the owl of Minerva spreads its wings only at dusk.
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